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the shared faith that the pioneer architectural
modernists had when they chartered a liner to
cruise the Mediterranean in agreeable com-
fort, and draw up their vision of what the
modern city must be, the charter of Athens.
They divided it into functional zones,
shaped by sunlight angles. That was a genera-
tion that was freed from the luxury of self-
doubt. We are not, and that is why we struggle
now when we try to find a renewed sense of
purpose about what cities should be. We are
full of doubt, or at least we certainly should
be. We are the witnesses to soured urban
utopias that were invented by some of the
architects on that liner, and propagated by a
political system that measured success in the
number of new buildings that it could deliver
each month.
Politicians love cranes; they need solutions
within the time frame of elections. The result
is a constant cycle of urban demolition and
reconstruction that is seen as the substitute
for thinking about how to address the deeper
issues. Engels and Ruskin reeled in horror at
the impact of urbanisation in 19thcentury
Manchester (a fraction of the scale of that in
the 21st century Pearl River Delta). The great
German architect, Karl Friederich Schinkel,
went there to learn the secrets of industrial
building: you can now see huge areas that
were originally built up in the 1880s and
demolished in the 1930s, and built up and
demolished again twice since then.
Visions for cities tend to be the creation of
the boasters. City builders have always had to
be pathological optimists, if not out-and-out
fantasists. They belong to a tradition that con-
nects the map makers, who parcel up pack-
ages of swamp land to sell to gullible pur-
chasers, and the ‘show’ apartment builders
who sell off plan, to investors in Shanghai
who are banking on a rising market making
them a paper profit before they have even had
to make good on their deposits.
There are visions of cities as machines for
making money, if not for turning the poor
into the not so poor, which is what attracts the
ambitious and the desperate to them in the
first place.
But there are other less tangible kinds of
visions too that no city can do without for
long. In the end it is the vision of what a city 
is that gives it a shared sense of itself. A city 
is an à la carte menu, that is what makes it 
different from a village which offers so much
less in the way of choice. A positive vision of
urbanity has to be based on ensuring that
more and more customers can afford to make
the choice.
Those who seek to understand the contem-
porary city have a lot to learn from novelists,
and film makers. Architects and city planners
are story tellers too, coming up with a narra-
tive long before they ever build anything.
They offer a story, or more often, a myth, of
community, or of greenness: an image of
modernity, or of tradition. It is the literary
view of the city from Dickens and Zola
onwards that allows us to understand its
nuances of light and shade. They help us
understand the flawed but rich nature of city
life that does not survive the conventional
response to urban reality, which is to try to
sweep the dark underbelly of the city away.
To sweep away the darkness is to risk the col-
lateral damage that will destroy the very quali-
ties that make a city work. It is to turn a city
into a village, which is no place for the dis-
possessed and the ambitious, desperate to
escape from poverty.
In London the Urban Age discussed the
area known as the King’s Cross railway lands,
a gash in the urban fabric that has never
healed since the canals and railways tore into
it at the start of the 19th century. It reflects the
reality of city life in the most brutal and
extreme form. Hookers and addicts share the
pavements with the commuters, skirting the
vast swathe of canals and sheds, trapped
between the Euston Road, and the residential
streets of Camden Town. It is undergoing a
paroxysm of development that irresistibly
recalls the feverish transformation of this very
piece of land portrayed by Charles Dickens in
Dombey and Son. Dickens captured the surre-
alistic dislocation of houses left stranded by
railway embankments, and roads that lead
he city is a subject that is appar-
ently about everything. It is
about climate change and racial
tolerance, social justice and eco-
nomic development, culture
and personal memory, national
identity and civil liberty. But
without some sort of focus, or
some framework applied to the ways in which
we think about it, the city as a subject that is so
all-embracing can end up being about every-
thing and so, in the end, about nothing.
Berlin, an atypical western European city,
that, unlike the other places that the Urban
Age caravan has examined in the last two
years, is attempting to accommodate shrink-
ing expectations, rather than expansion on an
explosive scale. Here our ambition is to pro-
vide that framework, to move beyond the col-
lection of data, and to put some of our cards
on the table.
To help us we have the statistical lessons
that we have tried to absorb over the journey
charted by the LSE and the Alfred Herrhausen
Society. We also have the impressionistic ones
we have acquired that can be as important.
Personally, I will take with me the view of
Johannesburg from the 50th floor of the
Carlton Centre, a perfect specimen of an
SOM (Skidmore, Owings and Merrill)
designed tower of the early 1970s, adjusting to
the new realities of South Africa. I will
remember the non meeting of minds of Rem
Koolhaas and Peter Eisenman, in New York,
where they demonstrated the difficulty that
architects can have in communicating with a
wider audience. I will not forget the sudden
silence that spread over a terrace on the Bund
in Shanghai when the news of multiple back-
pack bombs being detonated on the London
underground filtered through from half a
world away. I will remember the splendour of
the room in Mexico City in which the confer-
ence met, built at the turn of the 20th century
to house the boardroom of the ministry of
public building and works with a grandeur
that signalled the ambitions and dreams of a
new republic, and now a museum piece.
It is chastening, but valuable for a critic to
be confronted with how little they really
know. I hadn’t, before the Urban Age confer-
ence in Shanghai, understood that of its 18
million or so people, fully a quarter were ille-
gal migrants, or that the city had levels of
inequality of an order close to Manhattan’s.
Impressive, or a depressing change for the
country that Mao clothed in monotonous
olive. I knew that Johannesburg was a city
shaped by Apartheid, but I hadn’t understood
what it would mean to try not just to deal with
inequalities, but to operate against a back-
ground of a Soweto that was deliberately built
to exclude the possibilities of urban life. I
could not have imagined what it is like for the
city’s transport officials to work with a subur-
ban rail system which saw dozens of its
employees murdered last year – until I met
one of those officials. And until I had seen
white South African planners use the word
comrade to describe the black ANC council-
lors whom they worked for in the way that
their London equivalents might use the word
Mr, I did not really appreciate the nature of
politics in that city. Probably I still don’t.
Before I went to Mexico City earlier this
year, I had not grasped that it was no longer
the untameable monster that the world has
always assumed. Nor had I considered the 
significance of the networks linking its 
street traders with the factories in China 
supplying them.
In Mexico, it was Benjamino Gonzales’ bril-
liant presentation on the Faro community
arts project that stays in my memory most
vividly. It was flagged up as being a talk about
urban spaces. But in reality it was about some-
thing more important: self-organising urban-
ity. Then there is that mysterious quality of
citiness that the Urban Age conference has
been in pursuit of ever since it first met in
New York two years ago.
The most salutary lesson from the privilege
of being able to plug into the networks that
shape a different metropolis every four
months, is the understanding that no matter
how much the world’s cities operate as part of
a single global system, acquiring the same
kind of landmarks, museums, airports, free-
ways, and subject to the same quack remedies
of tax incentives and marketing programmes,
just how different and distinct they remain.
We do not belong to a generation that has
T
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oes the gradual disappearance of
public space have an impact on
our concept of the city?
Public space is a complex
notion. New York and London,
in their voluntary endeavours to
revitalise former derelict spaces,
have progressively defined
which users they envision will use future
embellished spaces that look public but in fact
are subject to control; either from private
security guards (ie waterfronts, commercial
malls), or from publicly hired security
employees (semi-public parks), or by regular
police officers. The problem does not arise
from the transgression of laws, which would
lead to sanctions, but from the very identity 
of people who are considered to fit the ‘unde-
sirable’ category, and whose presence may
generate a stop and search, or even a ban of
spatial use.
Such a process can be observed in
Shanghai, where obvious public spaces like
the Bund along the river or the public gar-
dens, are inviting many kinds of flâneurs to
stroll, among a pleasant diversity and density
of people. However, although perhaps less
apparent, control is nevertheless present,
emanating from two sources: from under-
cover policemen in charge of order who mix
with the crowds, and from society’s internal
social control system; which emerges when
those who do not ‘belong’ are spotted by other
citizens. Freedom yes, but under surveillance.
What about the two other large
megapolises of the South that are part of the
Urban Age selection?
In Mexico City, more than one million
residents each gave one peso to bring reality
to one of those numerous utopian visions of
parks, meant to coalesce a great variety of
visitors at the same time and in the same
space. The park designers aimed for a social
cohesion, transcending class divisions and
they relied on universal needs for peace,
entertainment and recreation within cities.
Micro control systems are however at work;
guards make sure that smooth processes,
organising movements, will be respected.
They act invisibly, they interpret situations,
they make sense of them, and they suggest
alternatives to CCTVs and other high-tech
surveillance methods.
The most problematic case is probably
Johannesburg, where so little public space is
allocated to density and diversity, unlike Rio
(Copacabana) or São Paulo (Avenida
Paulista). It is indeed strange that, despite the
efforts deployed by the city council, so many
public roads should still be barred from pub-
lic access and that so many private guards
(four to one public policeman – the second-
highest proportion in the world) should turn
neighbourhoods into fortresses, without any
real public debate on the issue. We are aware
that many changes are on their way and that
the reformed country is only twelve years old.
But, it seems that insufficient support and
resources allocated to reforms slow the
process of change.
That urban violence is used as an excuse
to refuse to live together and that enclosures
reinforce segregation cannot be ignored. Such
attitudes are lethal to cities. An anti-urban
discourse linking cities, fear and violence
should be resisted. The answer to urban fear is
not to exit the city, buy a gun and get shelter in
a gated community. In Venice, Norman Foster
courageously suggested that those who
choose to get away from the rest of the world
and contribute to the sprawl phenomenon
should pay very high taxes. When the happy
few require roads and power stations in order
to live on the edge, they indeed detour
resources and energies that should be allocat-
ed to the improvement of collective services
and spaces for the common good. More inclu-
sive cities are the solution.
Solutions are complex and must be 
tailor-made for each city (sometimes the
negotiations over ‘turf ’ ownership are strenu-
ous and costly), but they do exist. Teams 
of innovative architects, planners, scholars,
mayors and community representatives
expressing various residents’ aspirations have
learned how to weave back the social fabric
and interplay into space and agency. It takes
time, patience, imagination, skills and
resources to bring failing neighbourhoods
back to recovery.
Success exists and examples that should
be publicly brought forward and shared –
Urban Age’ s purpose – abound. Sometimes
high-tech firms settle in an unlikely place, and
subsequently public transportation improves
and critical masses of affordable homes for
the middle classes transform the identity of
space. Sometimes an art institution in Mexico
City, or a university and research centre pro-
viding top-quality expertise, or a new Court
of Justice including social services in a poorer
neighbourhood in New York, have a similar
effect. Each of these ‘solutions’ reveals a mix-
ture of various imaginations, voices, expert-
ise, trust and political will which link space
and agency. Public space is in those cases
(almost) synonymous with tranquillity.
Invisible or more visible alchemists have acted
to give each (resident, user, commuter,
investor) the sense of his or her belonging in a
shared urban space.
To summarise: cities have good news to
tell, relative to ongoing mutations and to the
ways they can thrive, working differently.
Sophie Body-Gendrot, Director and Professor of
Political Science and American Studies, Center
for Urban Studies, Sorbonne, Paris
IS THE CONCEPT 
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nowhere. Almost the same thing is happening
again. The huge glass and white steel box
tacked onto the back of Victorian St Pancras
Station, designed to handle the high speed rail
link to Paris and Brussels is nearing comple-
tion. It represents a construction project that
matches those of the Victorians, in its scale if
not in its confidence or architectural ambi-
tion. Negotiating the area, you thread your
way through new viaducts that erupt from the
mud, past tower cranes, and ancient ware-
houses and gasometers. The landscape is by
turns pastoral, and derelict. As it is now,
King’s Cross is a mud-splattered, anarchic
mess that reveals the shifting tectonic plates of
urban life. The new King’s Cross will be a
polite, comfortable place for commuters to
drink café latte on their way from the train to
the office. But it is unlikely to be a city in the
sense that Dickens or Zola would understand.
Urban space is something that Mexico City
makes you aware of in some provocative and
unexpected ways. The sheer size of the Zocalo,
reminding us of the Aztecs who laid it out,
and its mismatch with the colonial architec-
ture that forms its rim catches you by sur-
prise. It makes you think about Mexico’s orig-
inal builders, and their continuing, if some-
times submerged presence in the colonial
period. When you come to think about it, the
Zocalo is a public space defined as much by
absence as presence. The Zocalo’s continuing
uses are also political. Demonstrators form up
outside the offices of the federal district
administration, their banners fixed, under the
shadows of that enormous national flag,
demanding to be heard.
You could see another kind of public space
in Mexico presented in some of the diagrams
seen in our sessions on mobility and trans-
port. Professor Bernardo Navarro Benitez’s
uncanny diagrams looked like organic crystal
forms, or art works, that seemed to be trying
to tell us something important about how
space works, how space can be brittle and
fibrous, complex and multilayered. They
looked almost like the circuit boards for
Mexico City, the machine code revealed
beneath the pixels on the surface. The nervous
system underneath the skin.
It wasn’t quite the same kind of space as
that explored by Hermann Knoflacher with
his provocative pedestrian walking machine,
and its wry demonstration of the destructive
capacity of the car; or the layer upon layer 
of bus circuits and parking lots for the
National Autonomous University. Diagrams
that tell us why a University city is not yet a
city, precisely because it is too easy to map its
movement patterns.
The diagrams are all telling us something
important about the city, and how it moves.
And of course public space without the possi-
bility of movement in it is like a dead butterfly
in a specimen case. Because movement means
access, which is the real issue about space. And
as the Zocalo tells us, in Mexico or London,
Berlin, Shanghai, Johannesburg or New York,
space is as much about the symbolic and the
theatrical as it is to do with the technical.
There are other kinds of vision that start, as
so many urban visions have done, with an
attempt to deal with the pathology of the city:
modernism after all was probably as much
about notions of hygiene as anything else.
The city is a complex interaction of issues
and ambitions that are shaped by the everyday
choices of its citizens as much as by their
political leaders, and their officials. The devel-
opment of a city involves oil companies and
car builders, as much as the financial institu-
tions that make house building possible. It
involves the law, and investment regimes, as
well as such apparently simple ideas as being
able to take a breath of air without worrying
about the harm it’s going to do us, or our chil-
dren. A city is a vision as well as a mechanism,
in the sense that Bogatá’s bus lanes represent
easy movement for the masses, as opposed to
a regulatory system to force through change
on private car drivers. But given the costs and
obligations that come with the privileges of
urban life, a city is also a test of the limits of
the power of persuasion, as opposed to com-
pulsion. And in the end, a genuine city can
only be about the persuasion and not the
compulsion.
Deyan Sudjic, Director, Design Museum,
London
Visions for cities tend
to be the creation of
the boasters. City
builders have always
had to be pathological
optimists, if not out-
and-out fantasists
That urban violence 
is used as an excuse to
refuse to live together
and that enclosures
reinforce segregation
cannot be ignored.
Such attitudes are
lethal to cities
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Expanded informal economies are
emerging as part of these advanced urban
economies, evident in all our Urban Age cities,
whether in the global North or South. It is easy
to think of informalisation as anomalous, as
belonging to an older order. But in my reading
it is part of advanced capitalism. Informality
assumes a whole range of new meanings. At
the most abstract level it can be seen as multi-
plying the range of practices – economic,
artistic, professional – possible in these cities.
Complex cities allow for this multiplication
and diversifying in a way that neat suburbs do
not. While at one end of the scale informality
is a form of injustice and powerlessness, at the
other end it enables actors to ‘make’ new
economies – and is a form of survival but also
of creativity. Many immigrant entrepreneurs
start informally, because it allows a more
experimental form of business we might say.
Many Silicon Valley tycoons started informal-
ly in garages. But we also saw informal archi-
tectural practices in all our Urban Age cities –
from Mexico to Berlin.
The growing inequality and the massive
concentrations of power now evident in maj-
or complex cities form a basic context within
which some of these trends need to be situat-
ed. Cities have long had inequality, but what
we see today alongside older forms is a new
type of inequality. Homelessness has long
been part of cities. But where it once concern-
ed a single man – the hobo – now it is family
homelessness, with children the largest group
of homeless in large cities. These social and
spatial inequalities probably assume their
sharpest and most visible form in global cities.
There are also new technical histories in
the making. The city is one moment in often
complex processes that are partly electronic,
such as electronic markets, or part of hidden
infrastructures, such as fibre optic cables.
Embedded software for handling mass sys-
tems, such as public transport and public sur-
veillance, is an often invisible layer in a grow-
ing number of cities. Such embedded software
is guided by logics that are not necessarily part
of the social repertory through which we
understand those systems. As the use of
embedded software expands to more and
more infrastructures for daily life, we will
increasingly be interacting with the artefacts
of technology. Technical artefacts become
increasingly actors in the networks through
which we move. Buildings are today dense
sites for these types of interactions. These
acute concentrations of embedded software
and of connectivity infrastructures for digi-
tised space make the city less penetrable for
the ordinary citizen.
RE-INVENTING THE POLITICAL
The city is also potentially the site where all
these systems can become visible, a potential
further strengthened by the multiple globali-
ties, from economic to cultural to subjective,
that localise partly in cities. This in turn brings
up political challenges: at various points in
history cities have functioned as spaces that
politicised society. This is, again, one of those
periods. Today’s cities are the terrain where
people from all over the world intersect in
ways they do not anywhere else. In these com-
plex cities, diversity can be experienced
through the routines of daily life, workplaces,
public transport and urban events such as
demonstrations or festivals. Further, insofar 
as powerful global actors are making increas-
ing demands on urban space and thereby dis-
placing less powerful users, urban space
becomes politicised in the process of rebuild-
ing itself. This is politics embedded in the
physicality of the city. The emergent global
movement for the rights to the city is one
emblematic instance of this struggle. In
urbanising rights it makes them concrete: the
right to public space, to public transport, to
good neighbourhoods.
One question is whether a new type of
politics is being shaped through these con-
flicts, a politics that might also make the vari-
ety of inter-city networks into platforms for
global governance. Most of today’s major
social, political and economic challenges are
present in cities, often in both their most
acute and their most promising form: the
sharpest juxtapositions of the rich and the
poor, but also struggles for housing; anti-
immigrant politics, but also multiple forms of
integration and mixtures; the most powerful
and globalised economies, but also a prolifer-
ation of informal economies; the most power-
ful real estate developers, but also the biggest
group of builders in the world today – people
making shanty dwellings. How can we not ask
whether networks of cities can become plat-
forms for new types of global governance?
Saskia Sassen, Centennial Visiting Professor,
LSE and Ralph Lewis Professor of Sociology,
University of Chicago
The urban footprint 
of the global 
corporate economy
keeps expanding; 
we can measure this
expansion in 
kilometres and in
growing densities
y the mid-20th century, many of
our great cities were in physical
decay, losing population, eco-
nomic activity, key roles in the
national economy, and share of
national wealth. As we move
into the 21st century, cities have
re-emerged as strategic places
for a wide range of projects and dynamics.
The Urban Age project allowed us to establish
this directly for a set of very diverse cities.
MAKING NEW ECONOMIC HISTORIES
Critical, and partly underlying all the other
dimensions, is the new economic role of cities
in an increasingly globalised world. The for-
mation of inter-city geographies is contribut-
ing a critical infrastructure for a new global
political economy, new cultural spaces, and
new types of politics. Some of these inter-city
geographies are thick and highly visible – the
flows of professionals, tourists, artists and
migrants among specific groups of cities.
Others are thin and barely visible – the highly
specialised financial trading networks that
connect particular cities, depending on the
type of instrument involved, or the global
commodity chains for diverse products that
run from exporting hubs to importing hubs.
These circuits are multidirectional and
criss-cross the world, feeding into inter-city
geographies with both expected and unex-
pected strategic nodes. For instance, New
York is the leading global market to trade
financial instruments on coffee, even though
it does not grow a single bean. But a far less
powerful financial centre, Buenos Aires, is the
leading global market to trade financial
instruments on sunflower seeds. Cities locat-
ed on global circuits, whether few or many,
become part of distinct, often highly spe-
cialised inter-city geographies. Thus if I were
to track the global circuits of gold as a finan-
cial instrument, it is London, New York,
Chicago and Zürich that dominate. But if I
track the direct trading in the metal,
Johannesburg, Mumbai, Dubai and Sydney all
appear on the map. The number of cities that
get drawn into these inter-city geographies is
growing fast. For instance, the top 100 global
service firms together have affiliates in 315
cities worldwide. Looking at globalisation
through the lens of these specificities allows
us to recover the particular and diverse roles
of cities in the global economy.
While many of these global circuits have
long existed, what began to change in the
1980s was their proliferation and their
increasingly complex organisational and
financial framings. It has been the new 
challenge of coordinating, managing, and
servicing these increasingly complex, spe-
cialised and vast economic circuits that has
made cities strategic.
MAKING NEW SPATIAL HISTORIES
It is perhaps one of the great ironies of our
global digital age that it has produced not
only massive dispersal but also extreme con-
centrations of top-level resources in a limited
number of places. Indeed, the organisational
side of today’s global economy is located, and
continuously reinvented, in what has become
a network of about 40 major and not so major
global cities; this network includes all the
Urban Age cities. These global cities need to
be distinguished from the hundreds of cities
which are located on often just a few global
circuits: while these cities are articulated with
the global economy, they lack the mix of
resources to manage and service the global
operations of firms and markets. The reason
for this new strategic role can be captured in
the following microcosm: the more globalised
a firm’s operations and the more digitised its
product, the more complex its central head-
quarter functions become and hence the
more their execution benefits from dense,
resource-rich urban environments.
As a result, the interaction of centrality
and density takes on a whole new strategic
meaning in global cities. The urban footprint
of the global corporate economy keeps
expanding; we can measure this expansion 
in kilometres and in growing densities. The
five Urban Age cities we have worked with
thus far all show expansion and multiplica-
tion of central spaces along with physical den-
sity. This is the urban form hosting an
increasingly complex set of activities for the
management, servicing, designing, imple-
menting and coordinating of the global oper-
ations of firms and markets. Architecture,
urban planning and civil engineering have
played a critical role in building the new
expanded urban settings for this organisa-
tional side of the global economy. This is
architecture as inhabited infrastructure.
The much talked about homogenising 
of the urban landscape in these cities
responds to two different conditions. One 
is the consumer world, with homogenising
tropes that help in expanding and standardis-
ing markets to the point where they can
become global markets. But this is to be dis-
tinguished from the homogenising involved
in the organisational side of the global econo-
my – state-of-the-art office districts, airports,
hotels, services, and residential complexes for
the strategic workforces.
This reshaping responds to the needs
associated with housing these new
economies, and the cultures and politics they
entail. I would say that this homogenised
environment for the most complex and 
globalised functions is more akin to an infra-
structure, even though not in the convention-
al sense of that term. It is not simply a visual
code that aims at signalling a high stage of
development, as is so often posited in much 
of the commentary on the matter, and is the
belief of many developers.
We need to go beyond the visual tropes
and the homogenising effect, no matter how
distinguished the architecture. The key
becomes understanding what inhabits this
homogenised state of the art urban landscape
that recurs in city after city. We will find far
more diversity and distinct specialisations
across these cities than the newly built urban
landscapes suggest. The global economy
requires a standardised global infrastructure,
with global cities the most complex of these
infrastructures. But the actual economic
operations, especially their organisational
side, thrive on specialised differentiation.
Thus, as the global economy expands and
includes a growing diversity of national
economies, it is largely in the global cities of
each of these that the work of capturing the
specialised advantage of a national economy
gets done. To do this work requires state-of-
the-art office districts and all the require-
ments of luxury living. In that sense then,
much of this architectural environment is
closer to inhabited infrastructure – inhabited
by specialised functions and actors.
MAKING NEW URBAN HISTORIES
These conditions themselves have produced a
variety of responses, from renewed passions
for aestheticising the city, preserving the city
and ensuring the public-space aspect of cities.
The massive scale of today’s urban systems
has brought with it a revaluing of terrain
vagues and of modest spaces – where the prac-
tices of people can contribute to the making
of public space, beyond the monumentalised
public spaces of state and crown. Micro-
architectural interventions and informal
architectures can bring built complexity into
standardised spaces. This type of built com-
plexity can in turn engage the temporary
publics that take shape in cities in particular
spaces at specific times of the day or night.
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The formation of
inter-city geographies
is contributing a 
critical infrastructure
for a new global 
political economy, new
cultural spaces, and
new types of politics
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around capital intensive systems like heavy
rail which may not have an extensive catch-
ment area, yet require enormous funding
streams. Transport modes used by the 
majority of people in these cities, mainly
walking, cycling and microbuses, receive far
less attention.
Fortunately, land-use patterns in relation
to transport are being looked at with increas-
ing interest. In Mexico City, asentamientos
irregulars [informal settlements] such as
Ciudad Neza have been upgraded with public
funding, transforming the traditional squat-
ter settlement into a vibrant city of 1.5 million
people. There is a healthy mix of housing and
work places, and a large number of businesses
have been integrated providing nearly 65% of
jobs to local residents. Aiming for more inner
city housing, Mexico City has also imple-
mented its bando dos policy which requires
higher residential density levels while restrict-
ing new housing in the outer districts. In
Johannesburg, the debate about transport
and accessibility focuses increasingly on the
problems arising from the deliberately low
density levels of the Apartheid city; this has
led to first attempts for densification in town-
ships like Soweto.
Over the last decade there have been seri-
ous efforts in all six cities to bring land-use
and transport strategies closer together.
However despite investments and expertise,
the process of moving towards more sustain-
able urban structures, where movement is
based on public transport and non-motorised
mobility, has been rather slow. If cities in the
future will have to rely on sustainable trans-
port, then we need to move rapidly towards
understanding the forces that promote tradi-
tional car use with its vast need for space, par-
ticularly through parking. The consumption
of cars is still on the national agenda for eco-
nomic growth in five of the six countries to
which the Urban Age cities belong, and only
the UK’s economy is largely independent
from the production of automobiles. All six
cities certainly face strong pressure from indi-
vidual desires for motorisation and have only
been successful in resisting these pressures
when putting forward a widely accepted agen-
da prioritising quality of life in cities.
We need to work out the governance
structures and technology by which public
transport can save rapidly expanding cities
from simply adopting Western mobility
cycles. We need to understand what forces are
required to break the path dependencies in
the mature Urban Age cities to move towards
sustainable mobility in the near future.
The professional crisis of transport plan-
ning differs greatly to that of urbanism, which
was humiliated by a complete loss of control
during the last 30 years. The transport plan-
ning profession instead struggles first of all
with the fact that its subject is more about
politics than about economics, engineering or
any other scientific discipline. The second
challenge results from focusing only on
organising movement where, at least in the
case of the city, it needs to organise movement
and space. Still, it has been the professional
community around the world that has advo-
cated the most innovative urban transport
solutions for more than 30 years before they
were finally implemented as a result of strong
political leadership. Bogotá’s rapid bus system
and cycle network, London’s congestion
charge and Berlin’s multi-modal transport
approach are just three examples. Ultimately,
the future focus has to be the integration of
land-use and transport strategies as well as
the relationship between connecting places
while at the same time creating locations.
Once again, this needs to be understood on a
political level before it will begin to happen.
Hermann Knoflacher, Professor of Transport
Planning, Vienna University of Technology
Philipp Rode, Project Manager, Urban Age and
Associate, Cities Programme, LSE
Geetam Tiwari, Chair & Associate Professor,
TRIPP, Civil Engineering Department, Indian
Institute of Technology, Delhi
o society can exist without the
movement of people, goods and
information, and it is generally
regarded as a means for evolu-
tion, be it the facilitation of
trade or most importantly for
human interaction. Modern
transport is what collapses the
distances between two points and as such, it
needs to be available to all equally. But trans-
port is also deeply intrinsic and is often as
much of an end in itself. It offers the most
direct emotional experience of technical
progress; it is a lifestyle marker, the physical
representation of great political achievements
and the raison d’être for the world’s leading
industrial sector. The consequences are obvi-
ous: transport is one of the most contested
development areas, and while offering an
endless number of solutions remains
extremely controversial.
Cities initially promised high levels of
ideas and product exchange by creating
greater proximities. In doing so, they became
a transport solution themselves, one based on
the principle of avoiding transport or at least
of reducing its necessity. Economic, geo-
graphic and cultural factors drove the evolu-
tion of cities over time, but it was not until the
widespread use of the private motorcar that
the most basic concept of the city, that of
physical proximity and coexistence, was seri-
ously challenged. Suburban sprawl – driven
by the desire for more personal living space
with direct car access, combined with elevated
motorways, decentralised business parks,
shopping malls and vast car parks – was
indeed a radical shift in spatial development.
It was the overall unconvincing outcome of
the latter model and its enormous social and
environmental cost that has, over the last 30
years, introduced the return to normative
questions about the use of urban space in
time. Why cities, why proximity and what are
the right transport solutions? 
This debate has made enormous progress
and has resulted in extensive urban regenera-
tion efforts in cities around the world. In
addition, and differing from initial predic-
tions, the latest transport revolution based on
communication and information technology
has turned out to be supporting the city with
its genuine character. The advantage of
reduced commuting and less money spent on
travelling is as critical in the developing world
as are the benefits associated with urban liv-
ing for the more individualistic and atomised
society in the global North. Both require a
compact city at a human scale that allows for
extensive interaction, complexity and public
life. The initial question about the right trans-
port solutions bounced back as one about the
city and its form, which ultimately is the ques-
tion about how we want to live together. This
new consensus looks at land use and rehabili-
tates the concept of dense urban environ-
ments with public transport as their back-
bone. It acknowledges that there is a threshold
level of car use beyond which cities are seri-
ously at risk; it puts pedestrian-friendly envi-
ronments at the top of the agenda and regards
walking and cycling as serious contributions
to urban mobility.
The older, mature cities investigated by
the Urban Age programme – New York,
London and Berlin – include many examples
of this paradigm shift. London is currently
implementing its 100 public space pro-
gramme, the number of cyclists has doubled
within the last 5 years, and the city’s conges-
tion charge has reduced car use in central
London by 15% while subsidising the 40%
increase in bus use since 2001. New York City
has made an enormous effort to upgrade its
public transport system by investing more
than €32 billion ($40 billion) since 1982 and
has seen a 13% decline in car ownership levels
between 1990 and 2003. In Berlin, 32% of all
trips are done on foot or by bicycle, and since
1990 its public transport infrastructure has
been upgraded to cater for a potential extra 1
million inhabitants with its S-Bahn, tram and
regional rail network. The city has also been
active in promoting car sharing and multi-
modal transport. Regarding these trends it
needs to be emphasised that innovation was
led by smaller cities mainly in continental
Europe. Barcelona, Copenhagen and Vienna
informed public space strategies in London;
Zürich and Karlsruhe were highly influential
for the rehabilitation of tram lines as surface
public transport in Berlin and around the
world; while Amsterdam and Freiburg gener-
ally pushed the agenda for urban cycling.
Apart from these trends, the status quo in
these three mature Urban Age cities is still one
of dominating car use at the metropolitan
level, despite an extensive public transport
system. The overall rising energy consump-
tion for transport is best illustrated by a steep
increase of Sports Utility Vehicles even within
the city’s boundaries.
On the other hand, developments in the
rapidly expanding cities investigated by
Urban Age – Shanghai, Mexico City and
Johannesburg – follow a distinctively differ-
ent pattern. A vast majority of the population
has long been and still is dependent on walk-
ing, cycling and public transport, the latter
mainly organised by the informal sector.
Access to private cars is still the preserve of a
small minority. Historically these three cities
have been different in many aspects. Shanghai
invested heavily in its cycling infrastructure
until the mid-1980s and it was only with the
opening of China’s economy that major
changes of government policy were brought
about. The central government in Beijing
declaring car production as pillar industry is
critical to understanding city level transport
strategies that produce elevated highways,
satellite towns and mono-functional districts
while putting human scale transport infra-
structure on the back burner. Shanghai is 
successful in attracting more car use which
doubled between 1995 and 2004 leading to
increased average commuting distances
which also doubled. During the same period,
the city’s official policy to reduce cycling led
to a drop from almost 40% to 25% of all trips.
Similar decisions were taken in Mexico City.
Here, around 50,000 minibuses and
microbuses are handling the majority of the
trips while 40% of the city’s transport budget
between 2000 and 2006 has been spent on its
Segundo Piso, an elevated highway built
exclusively for private cars and used by not
even 1% of residents.
Johannesburg’s public space has been
taken over by traffic, shockingly illustrated 
by its accident statistics of 56 fatalities per
100,000 inhabitants per annum compared 
to 3 in London and 7 in Mexico City. The city
seems to have surrendered to the safe and 
private environments of shopping malls.
Marginalisation and containment planned
under Apartheid has been perpetuated in the
post-Apartheid period. The percentage of
stranded people who walk to work for more
than 30 minutes, often under dangerous cir-
cumstances and unable to afford any form 
of public transport, has increased. 46% of
households are spending more than 10% 
of their income on daily commuting. The
main public transport provision, the city’s
mini bus taxis, receives no operating subsidy
while the provincial government is planning
to invest €2.1 billion ($2.7 billion) in a rapid
rail project.
Clearly, car-based mobility solutions dis-
proportionately dominate transport agendas
and investments in the three rapidly expand-
ing cities, mocking statements, intentions and
policy goals on sustainability, resource man-
agement and social inclusion. If put forward,
sustainable transport concepts are centred
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sustainable transport,
then we need to move
rapidly towards
understanding the
forces which promote
traditional car use
with its vast need for
space, particularly
through parking
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vate; out of such conditions comes the unex-
pected encounter, the chance discovery, the
innovation. Her view, reflected in the bon mot
of William Empson, was that ‘the arts result
from over-crowding’.
Jacobs sought to define particular strate-
gies for urban development, once a city is
freed from the constraints of either equilibri-
um or integration. These include encouraging
quirky, jerry-built adaptations or additions to
existing buildings; encouraging uses of public
spaces which don’t fit neatly together, such as
putting an AIDS hospice square in the middle
of a shopping street. In her view, big capital-
ism and powerful developers tend to favour
homogeneity: determinate, predictable, and
balanced in form. The role of the radical plan-
ner therefore is to champion dissonance. In
her famous declaration: ‘if density and diver-
sity give life, the life they breed is disorderly’.
The open city feels like Naples, the closed city
feels like Frankfurt.
For a long time, I dwelt in my own work
happily in Jacobs’ shadow – both her enmity
to the closed system (though the formal 
concept is mine, not hers) and her advocacy
of complexity, diversity, and dissonance.
Recently, in re-reading her work, I’ve detect-
ed glints of something lurking beneath this
stark contrast.
If Jane Jacobs is the urban anarchist she is
often said to be, then she is an anarchist of a
peculiar sort, her spiritual ties closer to
Edmund Burke than to Emma Goldmann.
She believes that in an open city, as in the nat-
ural world, social and visual forms mutate
through chance variation; people can best
absorb, participate, and adapt to change if it
happens step by lived step. This is evolution-
ary urban time, the slow time needed for an
urban culture to take root, then to foster, then
to absorb chance and change. It is why Naples,
Cairo, or New York’s Lower East Side, though
resource-poor, still ‘work’ in the sense that
people care deeply about where they live.
People live into these places, like nesting. Time
breeds that attachment to place.
In my own thinking, I’ve wondered what
kinds of visual forms might promote this
experience of time. Can these attachments be
designed by architects? Which designs might
abet social relationships that endure, just
because they can evolve and mutate? The
visual structuring of evolutionary time is a
systematic property of the open city. To make
this statement more concrete, I’d like to
describe three systematic elements of an open
city: 1. passage territories; 2. incomplete form;
3. development narratives.
1. Passage territories
I’d like to describe in some detail the experi-
ence of passing through different territories of
the city, both because that act of passage is
how we know the city as a whole, and also
because planners and architects have such dif-
ficulties designing the experience of passage
from place to place. I’ll start with walls, which
seem to be structures inhibiting passage, and
then explore some of the ways edges of urban
territory function like walls.
a. Walls: The wall would seem an unlikely
choice; it is an urban construction which lit-
erally closes in a city. Until the invention of
artillery, people sheltered behind walls when
attacked; the gates in walls also served to regu-
late commerce coming into cities, often being
the place in which taxes were collected.
Massive medieval walls, such as those surviv-
ing in Aix-en-Provence or in Rome, furnish a
perhaps misleading general picture; ancient
Greek walls were lower and thinner. But we
also mis-imagine how those medieval walls
themselves functioned. Though they shut
closed, they also served as sites for unregulat-
ed development in the city; houses were built
on both sides of medieval town walls; infor-
mal markets selling black-market or untaxed
goods sprung up nestled against them; the
zone of the wall was where heretics, foreign
exiles, and other misfits tended to gravitate
towards, again far from the controls of the
centre. They were spaces that would have
attracted the anarchic Jane Jacobs.
But they were also sites that might have
suited her organic temperament. These walls
functioned much like cell membranes, both
porous and resistant. That dual quality of the
membrane is, I believe, an important princi-
ple for visualising more modern living urban
forms. Whenever we construct a barrier, we
have to equally make the barrier porous; the
distinction between inside and outside has to
be breachable, if not ambiguous.
The usual contemporary use of plate-
glass for walls doesn’t do this; true, on the
ground plane you see what’s inside the build-
ing, but you can’t touch, smell, or hear any-
thing within. The plates are usually rigidly
fixed so that there is only one, regulated,
entrance within. The result is that nothing
much develops on either side of these trans-
parent walls, as in Mies van der Rohe’s
Seagram Building in New York or Norman
Foster’s new London City Hall: you have dead
space on both sides of the wall; where you
would expect life in the building to accumu-
late. By contrast, the 19th-century architect
Louis Sullivan used much more primitive
forms of plate glass more flexibly, as invita-
tions to gather, to enter a building or to dwell
at its edge; his plate glass panels function as
porous walls. This contrast in plate glass
design brings out one current failure of imag-
ination in using a modern material so that it
has a sociable effect.
The idea of a cellular wall, which is both
resistant and porous, can be extended from
single buildings to the zones in which the dif-
ferent communities of a city meet.
b. Borders: Ecologists like Steven Gould draw
our attention to an important distinction in
the natural world, that between boundaries
and borders. The boundary is an edge where
things end; the border is an edge where differ-
ent groups interact. In natural ecologies, bor-
ders are the places where organisms become
more interactive, due to the meeting of differ-
ent species or physical conditions. For
instance, where the shoreline of a lake meets
solid land is an active zone of exchange; here
is where organisms find and feed off other
organisms. The same is true of temperature
layers within a lake: where layer meets layer
defines the zone of the most intense biological
activity. Not surprisingly, it is also at the bor-
derline where the work of natural selection is
the most intense. Whereas the boundary is a
guarded territory, as established by prides of
lions or packs of wolves. The boundary estab-
lishes closure, whereas the border functions
more like a medieval wall. The border is a 
liminal space.
In the realm of human culture, territories
consist similarly of boundaries and borders –
in cities, most simply, there is a contrast
between gated communities and complex,
open streets. But the distinction cuts deeper
in urban planning.
When we imagine where the life of a
community is to be found, we usually look for
it in the centre of a community; when we
want to strengthen community life, we try to
intensify life at the centre. The edge condition
is seen to be more inert, and indeed modern
The result of over-
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urban environments
decay much more
quickly than urban
fabric inherited from
the past
HE CLOSED SYSTEM: THE BRITTLE CITY
The cities everyone wants to live
in should be clean and safe, pos-
sess efficient public services, be
supported by a dynamic econo-
my, provide cultural stimulation,
and also do their best to heal 
society’s divisions of race,
class, and ethnicity. These are not the cities 
we live in.
Cities fail on all these counts due to gov-
ernment policy, irreparable social ills, and
economic forces beyond local control. The
city is not its own master. Still, something has
gone wrong, radically wrong, in our concep-
tion of what a city should be. We need to
imagine just what a clean, safe, efficient,
dynamic, stimulating, just city would look
like concretely – we need those images to con-
front critically our masters with what they
should be doing – and it is exactly this critical
imagination of the city which is weak.
This weakness is a particularly modern
problem: the art of designing cities declined
drastically in the middle of the 20th century. In
saying this, I am propounding a paradox, for
today’s planner has an arsenal of technologi-
cal tools – from lighting to bridging and tun-
nelling to materials for buildings – which
urbanists even a hundred years ago could not
begin to imagine: we have more resources to
use than in the past, but resources we don’t
use very creatively.
This paradox can be traced to one big
fault. That fault is over-determination, both
of the city’s visual forms and its social func-
tions. The technologies, which make experi-
ment possible, have been subordinated to a
regime of power that wants order and control.
Urbanists, globally, anticipated the ‘control
freakery’ of New Labour by a good half-centu-
ry; in the grip of rigid images, precise delin-
eations, the urban imagination lost vitality.
In particular, what’s missing in modern
urbanism is a sense of time – not time looking
backwards nostalgically but forward-looking
time, the city understood as process, its
imagery changing through use, an urban
imagination image formed by anticipation,
friendly to surprise.
A portent of the freezing of the imagina-
tion of cities appeared in Le Corbusier’s ‘Plan
Voisin’ for Paris in the mid-1920s. The archi-
tect conceived of replacing a large swath of the
historic centre of Paris with uniform, X-
shaped buildings; public life on the ground
plane of the street would be eliminated; the
use of all buildings would be coordinated by a
single master-plan. Not only is Le Corbusier’s
architecture a kind of industrial manufacture
of buildings, he has in the ‘Plan Voisin’ tried to
destroy just those social elements of the city
which produce change in time, by eliminating
unregulated life on the ground plane; people
live and work, in isolation, higher up.
This dystopia became reality in various
ways. The Plan’s building-type shaped public
housing from Chicago to Moscow, producing
housing estates which came to resemble ware-
houses for the poor. Le Corbusier’s intended
destruction of vibrant street life was realised
in suburban growth for the middle classes,
with the replacement of high streets by mono-
function shopping malls, by gated communi-
ties, by schools and hospitals built as isolated
campuses. The proliferation of zoning regula-
tions in the 20th century is unprecedented in
the history of urban design, and this prolifer-
ation of rules and bureaucratic regulations
has disabled local innovation and growth,
frozen the city in time.
The result of over-determination is what
could be called the Brittle City. Modern urban
environments decay much more quickly than
urban fabric inherited from the past. As uses
change, buildings are now destroyed rather
than adapted; indeed, the over-specification
of form and function makes the modern
urban environment peculiarly susceptible 
to decay. The average lifespan of new public
housing in Britain is now 40 years; the 
average lifespan of new skyscrapers in New
York is 35 years.
It might seem that the Brittle City would
in fact stimulate urban growth, the new now
more rapidly sweeping away the old, but again
the facts argue against this view. In the United
States, people flee decaying suburbs rather
than re-invest in them: in Britain and on the
European continent, as in America,‘renewing’
the inner city most often means displacing the
people who have lived there thus far. ‘Growth’
in an urban environment is a more compli-
cated phenomenon than simple replacement
of what existed before; growth requires a dia-
logue between past and present, it is a matter
of evolution rather than erasure.
This principle is as true socially as it is
architecturally. The bonds of community 
cannot be conjured up in an instant, with a
stroke of the planner’s pen; they too require
time to develop. Today’s ways of building
cities – segregating functions, homogenising
population, pre-empting through zoning and
regulation of the meaning of place – fail to
provide communities the time and space
needed for growth.
The Brittle City is a symptom. It repre-
sents a view of society itself as a closed system.
The closed system is a conception that dogged
state socialism throughout the 20th century as
much as it shaped bureaucratic capitalism.
This view of society has two essential attrib-
utes: equilibrium and integration.
The closed system ruled by equilibrium
derives from a pre-Keynesian idea of how
markets work. It supposes something like a
bottom line in which income and expenses
balance. In state planning, information feed-
back loops and internal markets are meant to
ensure that programmes do not ‘over-com-
mit’, do not ‘suck resources into a black hole’ –
such is the language of recent reforms of the
health service, familiar again to urban plan-
ners in the ways infrastructure resources for
transport get allocated. The limits on doing
any one thing really well are set by the fear of
neglecting other tasks. In a closed system, a
little bit of everything happens all at once.
Second, a closed system is meant to be an
integrated system. Ideally, every part of the
system has a place in an overall design; the
consequence of that ideal is to reject, to eject,
experiences that stick out because they con-
test or are disorienting; things that ‘don’t fit’
are diminished in value. The emphasis on
integration puts an obvious bar on experi-
ment; as the inventor of the computer icon,
John Seely Brown, once remarked: every tech-
nological advance poses at the moment of its
birth a threat of disruption and dysfunction
to a larger system. The same threatening
exceptions occur in the urban environment,
threats which modern city planning has tried
to forestall by accumulating a mountain of
rules defining historical, architectural, eco-
nomic, and social context – ‘context’ being a
polite but potent word in repressing anything
that doesn’t fit in, context ensuring that noth-
ing sticks out, offends, or challenges.
Thus, the sins of equilibrium and integra-
tion bedevil coherence, for planners of educa-
tion as much as planners of cities, as planning
sins have crossed the line between state capi-
talism and state socialism. The closed system
thus betrays the 20th-century bureaucrat’s
horror of disorder.
The social contrast to the closed system is
not the free market, nor is a place ruled by
developers the alternative to the Brittle City.
That opposition is in fact not what it seems.
The cunning of neo-liberalism in general, and
of Thatcherism in particular, was to speak the
language of freedom whilst manipulating
closed bureaucratic systems for private gain
by an élite. Equally, in my experience as a
planner, those developers in London, as in
New York, who complain most loudly about
zoning restrictions are all too adept in using
these rules at the expense of communities.
The contrast to the closed system lies in 
a different kind of social system, not in brute
private enterprise – a social system that is
open rather than closed. The characteristics 
of such an open system and its realisation in
an open city are what I wish to explore in
this essay.
THE OPEN SYSTEM
The idea of an open city is not my own: credit
for it belongs to the great urbanist Jane Jacobs
in the course of arguing against the urban
vision of Le Corbusier. She tried to under-
stand what results when places become both
dense and diverse, as in packed streets or
squares, their functions both public and pri-
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The role of the radical
planner therefore is to
champion dissonance
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planning practices, such as sealing the edges
of communities with highways, create rigid
boundaries, lacking any porosity. But neglect
of the edge condition – boundary thinking, if
you like – means that exchange between dif-
ferent racial, ethnic, or class communities is
diminished. By privileging the centre we can
thus weaken the complex interactions neces-
sary to join up the different human groups the
city contains.
The porous wall and the edge as border
create essential physical elements for an open
system in cities. Both porous walls and bor-
ders create liminal space; that is, space at the
limits of control, limits which permit the
appearance of things, acts, and persons
unforeseen, yet focused and sited. The biolog-
ical psychologist Lionel Festinger once char-
acterised such liminal spaces as defining the
importance of ‘peripheral vision’; sociologi-
cally and urbanistically, these sites operate
differently from those places which concen-
trate differences in a centre; on the horizon, at
the periphery, at the border, differences stand
out since one is aware one is crossing out of
one territory into another.
2. Incomplete Form
This discussion of walls and borders leads log-
ically to a second systematic characteristic of
the open city: incomplete form. Incomplete-
ness may seem the enemy of structure, but
this is not the case. The designer needs to cre-
ate physical forms of a particular sort, ‘incom-
plete’ in a special way.
When we design a street, for instance, so
that buildings are set back from a street wall,
the space left open in front is not truly public
space; instead the building has been with-
drawn from the street. We know the practical
consequences; people walking on a street
tend to avoid these recessed spaces. It’s better 
planning if the building is brought forward,
into the context of other buildings; though
the building will become part of the urban
fabric, some of its volumetric elements will
now be incompletely disclosed. There is
incompleteness in the perception of what 
the object is.
Incompleteness of form extends to the 
very context of buildings themselves. In clas-
sical Rome, Hadrian’s Pantheon co-existed
with the less distinguished buildings that 
surrounded it in the urban fabric, though
Hadrian’s architects conceived the Pantheon
as a self-referential object. We find the same
co-existence in many other architectural
monuments: St Paul’s in London, Rockefeller
Center in New York, the Maison Arabe in
Paris – all great works of architecture which
stimulate building around themselves. It’s the
fact of that stimulation, rather than the fact
that the buildings are of lesser quality, which
counts in urban terms: the existence of one
building sited in such a way that it encourages
the growth of other buildings around it.
And now the buildings acquire their specifi-
cally urban value by their relationship to each
other; they become in time incomplete forms
if considered alone, by themselves.
Incomplete form is most of all a kind of
creative credo. In the plastic arts it is conveyed
in sculpture purposely left unfinished; in
poetry it is conveyed in, to use Wallace
Steven’s phrase, the ‘engineering of the frag-
ment’. The architect Peter Eisenman has
sought to evoke something of the same 
credo in the term ‘light architecture’, meaning
an architecture planned so that it can be
added to, or more importantly, revised inter-
nally in the course of time, as the needs of
habitation change.
This credo opposes the simple idea of
replacement of form which characterises the
Brittle City, but it is a demanding opposition.
When we try to convert office blocks to resi-
dential use, for instance.
3. Narratives of Development 
Our work as urbanists aims first of all to
shape the narratives of urban development.
By that, we mean that we focus on the stages
in which a particular project unfolds.
Specifically, we try to understand what ele-
ments should happen first, what then are the
consequences of this initial move. Rather than
a lock-step march towards achieving a single
end, we look at the different and conflicting
possibilities which each stage of the design
process should open up; keeping these possi-
bilities intact, leaving conflict elements in
play, opens up the design system.
We claim no originality for this approach.
If a novelist were to announce at the begin-
ning of a story, here’s what will happen, what
the characters will become, and what the story
means, we would immediately close the book.
All good narrative has the property of explor-
ing the unforeseen, of discovery; the novelist’s
art is to shape the process of that exploration.
The urban designer’s art is akin.
In sum, we can define an open system as
one in which growth admits conflict and dis-
sonance. This definition is at the heart of
Darwin’s understanding of evolution; rather
than the survival of the fittest (or the most
beautiful), he emphasised the process of
growth as a continual struggle between equi-
librium and disequilibrium; an environment
rigid in form, static in programme, is doomed
in time; bio-diversity instead gives the natural
world the resources to provision change.
That ecological vision makes equal sense of
human settlements, but it is not the vision
that guided 20th-century state planning.
Neither state capitalism nor state socialism
embraced growth in the sense Darwin under-
stood it in the natural world – in environ-
ments which permitted interaction among
organisms with different functions, endowed
with different powers.
4. Democratic Space 
When the city operates as an open system –
incorporating principles of porosity of terri-
tory, narrative indeterminacy and incomplete
form – it becomes democratic not in a legal
sense, but as physical experience.
In the past, thinking about democracy
focused on issues of formal governance, today
it focuses on citizenship and issues of partici-
pation. Participation is an issue that has
everything to do with the physical city and 
its design. For example, in the ancient polis,
the Athenians put the semi-circular theatre 
to political use; this architectural form pro-
vided good acoustics and a clear view of
speakers in debates; moreover, it made the
perception of other people’s responses during
debates possible.
In modern times, we have no similar model
of democratic space – certainly no clear 
imagination of an urban democratic space.
John Locke defined democracy in terms of
a body of laws which could be practiced any-
where. Democracy in the eyes of Thomas
Jefferson was inimical to life in cities; he
thought the spaces it required could be no
larger than a village. His view has persisted.
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, cham-
pions of democratic practices have identified
these with small, local communities, face-to-
face relationships.
Today’s city is big, filled with migrants and
ethnic diversities, in which people belong to
many different kinds of community at the
same time – through their work, families,
consumption habits and leisure pursuits. For
cities like London and New York becoming
global in scale, the problem of citizen partici-
pation is how people can feel connected to
others, when, necessarily, they cannot know
them. Democratic space means creating a
forum for these strangers to interact.
In London, a good example of how this 
can occur is the creation of a corridor connec-
tion between St Paul’s Cathedral and the 
Tate Modern Gallery, spanned by the new
Millennium Bridge. Though highly defined,
the corridor is not a closed form; along both
the south and north bank of the Thames it is
generating regeneration of lateral buildings
unrelated to its own purposes and design.
And almost immediately upon opening,
this corridor has stimulated informal mixings
and connections among people walking the
span within its confines, and has prompted 
an ease among strangers, which is the founda-
tion for a truly modern sense of ‘us’. This is
democratic space.
The problem cities face today is how to cre-
ate, in less ceremonial spaces, some of the
same sense of relatedness among strangers. It
is a problem in the design of public spaces in
hospitals, in the making of urban schools, in
big office complexes, in the renewal of high
streets, and most particularly in the places
where the work of government gets done.
How can such places be opened up? How can
the divide between inside and outside be
bridged? How can design generate new
growth? How can visual form invite engage-
ment and identification? These are the press-
ing questions which urban design must
address in the Urban Age.
Richard Sennett, Professor of Sociology, London
School of Economics and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
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here are four key topics that
Urban Age has raised about city
governance in New York,
London, Shanghai, Mexico City,
Johannesburg, and Berlin: the
fragmentation of the metropoli-
tan areas in which the cities are
located; the organisation of the
cities themselves as vehicles for the provision
of governmental services; the impact of the
concept of being a ‘global city’ on city deci-
sion-making; and the role of privatisation in
city planning and service delivery.
None of these cities is large enough to
encompass its entire region, and none is ever
likely to do so. But that doesn’t mean that the
region is already the ‘real’ city. Since no
regional political organisation exists that can
react to or help direct public or private deci-
sions, the fragmented municipal governments
– along with the national and (for some cities)
state or provincial governments – make the
necessary policy decisions. The questions are
whether and how to change this.
The cities themselves can be seen not just
as too small to be effective but also too large.
Most, but not all, of them subdivide the city
government to deal with local matters. But the
organisation of these boroughs, districts, and
sub-regions differs radically, and the question
is how best to set them up. This issue and the
need for regional thinking are not unrelated
topics. The empowerment of a region with
millions (in Shanghai tens of millions) of
people would not allow for meaningful dem-
ocratic participation by local citizens. The
current boundaries of the principal cities are
themselves inadequate to this task. Sub-city
governments, by contrast, can enable citizens’
participation in the daily governmental deci-
sion-making that affects their lives.
How does one understand the impact of
their global city status on the power of these
cities? More precisely, what is the role of the
city government in producing, or at least fur-
thering, the process of becoming a global city?
There is little doubt that government officials
in all of the cities now seek to promote their
global city status. But none of them can easily
control such a development, let alone rethink
or redirect city policy away from such a goal.
Yet many city residents have no connection to
the global business network or even to the
neighbourhoods where it is located. And tra-
ditional city services (education, sanitation,
housing, policing) have to compete for
resources against those seeking to support the
global city policy from a limited city budget.
Should the national (or state) governments
delegate greater power to these cities to revise
their current global city focus?
The city efforts to promote being a global
city are but one example of the trend towards
privatisation in these cities. Perhaps the most
significant illustration of this trend is the cur-
rent emphasis on ‘governance’, rather than
government, as the vehicle for public policy
decision-making. This emphasis and the
focus on being a global city reinforce each
other. Governance imagines ‘stakeholders’
being ‘at the table’, working with city officials
and others to formulate policy through con-
sensus. It’s unimaginable that representatives
of global business enterprises will be excluded
from such a meeting. It’s quite imaginable,
on the other hand, that there will no one 
there from the floating population, the infor-
mal economy, or representing the poor new-
comers who have recently immigrated from
another country. Given the embrace by 
city officials of a globally oriented policy,
the invited stakeholders can easily think 
that the overall direction of city policy is
uncontroversial – indeed, is a worldwide 
phenomenon that no one in the room could
conceivably resist.
The issues of privatisation and of the fos-
tering of the global city are intimately con-
nected with the first two topics listed above:
regional planning and sub-city democracy.
The latter two topics focus on the nature and
power of government institutions, not on pri-
vatisation or public-private structures of gov-
ernance. Making government work better,
and making it more responsive to its citizens,
strengthens the role of government as it seeks
to develop a ‘partnership’ with private and
non-profit institutions. Creating regional and
sub-city structures is one way to do so. A
change in the current method of governing
cities can thus have an impact, not only on
government but also on governance – on the
role of democracy in the world’s major cities.
If public-private partnerships are the wave of
the future – at least, the wave of the near-term
future – it is important to re-invigorate the
‘public’ half of the arrangement.
Doing this in the six very different con-
texts we have examined would be carried out
by six different policies. Some cities encom-
pass a sensible subdivision of their region
(London, Shanghai) and some don’t (New
York, Mexico City, Berlin). Some are con-
trolled directly by the national government
(Mexico City), some by state government
(New York), and some are simultaneously
cities and states (Berlin, Shanghai). Some
have subdivisions that may be too powerful
(London), some that may be too weak
(Mexico City, Berlin), and some don’t have
effective subdivisions at all (New York). Some
have vigorous democracies and one
(Shanghai) does not have an elected govern-
ment. It’s possible to outline a subdivision
and regional structure – and a conception of
city power – in general terms. But their appli-
cation in each of these contexts will differ
enormously. The same can be said about gov-
ernance and the focus on being a global city:
New York and London, on the one hand, and
Mexico City and Johannesburg on the other,
are not similarly situated on either score. And
Berlin and Shanghai are not comparable to
any of the other four – or to each other.
Gerald Frug, Louis D Brandeis Professor of Law,
Harvard University
GOVERNANCE AND LEGAL
STRUCTURES
T
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public investment in facilities and open
spaces, could end up with environments that
lack the vibrancy and urbanity of the city’s
diverse neighbourhoods.
Leaving New York in a snowstorm after a
four-hour taxi ride to JFK airport and taking
the 373 km/h, fifteen-minute Magnetic
Levitation (Maglev) train journey from
Shanghai airport to the ‘centre’ is bracing at
many levels. New York feels delicate and even
fragile in contrast to the heroic scale and pace
of change in China’s febrile mercantile city –
where over 5,000 towers with more than 8
storeys high have been built within 25 years.
The raised Maglev monorail flies over a land-
scape of serial duplications of cookie-cutter
gated communities – regimented apartment
blocks neatly aligned at equal distances – with
vast billboards advertising the very same real
estate opportunities, and isolated reflecting
glass skyscrapers that constitute Shanghai’s
urban experiment-in-the-making in a city of
over eighteen million people. The drivers
behind this hyper-scale residential develop-
ment are not only the high levels of in-migra-
tion typical of so many cities of the global
South, but also the overpowering demand by
the city’s residents, especially its emerging
professional class, for more space and facili-
ties inside their homes. Only fifteen years ago,
the average space available to a single person
in Shanghai was six square metres, roughly
the size of small car. Today, that size has at
least doubled, fuelling the housing boom that
marks the skyline, and, more significantly for
its negative impact on the public realm, the
ground level in every corner of the city. The
decision to accommodate growth by building
high, with single point blocks surrounded by
car ramps and empty open space, is damaging
the subtle urban grain of a city of immense
character and dynamic street life – so visibly
threatened by the design and typology of the
vast majority of new developments.
Shanghai’s city planners are aware that in
the pursuit of economic progress, ‘mistakes’
are being made that at some point in time will
need to be ‘corrected’. Forced relocation of
inner city dwellers (to remote highrise
estates), the banning of bicycles and motor-
cycles on selected streets (because they cause
congestion), the construction of more elevat-
ed motorways (to supposedly relieve conges-
tion), and the cynical appropriation of prime
sites by corporate behemoths (especially
along the Hung Po River) are indicators of an
unsustainable development pattern balanced
by significant public investment in the under-
ground system with the addition of 218 kilo-
metres (over half of New York City’s entire
network) in the next years. The much cele-
brated policy of eleven new satellite towns on
the fringes of Shanghai’s vast metropolitan
area, each themed according to national
flavours – the ‘German’ Town, the ‘Italian’
Town, the ‘Scandinavian’ Town, and so on –
has been quietly abandoned in favour of a
more pragmatic response to the needs of a
rampant real estate sector – one of the many
ambiguities of this independent Socialist city
which has recently witnessed the effect of
Beijing-directed Communist Party purges
among its ruling élites.
London is also juggling with the interplay
of private interests and public intervention, as
it once again – like New York – faces a period
of intense growth after decades of decline.
While a mere 750,000 people will be added to
London’s current total of 7.3 million by 2015
– a modest figure in comparison to the
growth rates of Shanghai or Mexico City –
most new Londoners will be from outside the
UK and many from the enlarged European
Union attracted by 400,000 new jobs in the
city’s strong service and business sectors. The
city’s spatial configuration – a dispersed,
multi-centred, green organic urban structure,
unevenly distributed on both sides of the
winding River Thames, which flows from the
affluent west to the poorer east – has in many
ways determined the shape of its future devel-
opment. One of the first decisions taken by
the new Mayor of London in 2001 (the
Mayoral Office, itself a new institution in the
history of governance of this 2,000-year-old
city) was to accommodate all growth within
the city’s existing boundary – the so-called
Green Belt. The combination of a demo-
graphic and economic growth, a strong prop-
erty market and the availability of brownfield
sites – ex-industrial areas, old railway goods
yards, redundant gas and electricity depots –
has kick-started an unprecedented process of
urban retro-fitting that is transforming the
image as well as the reality of living and work-
ing in London. Clusters of highrise buildings
are springing up around existing and new
business hubs, while the townscape of the
Thames is filling up with a new generation 
of office and residential structures that add
little to the urban quality or grain of the city,
reemphasising the lasting value of London’s
traditional stock of terraced housing, which,
like Berlin’s perimeter housing or New York’s
mansion block, has demonstrated enormous
capacity for change and adaptation as the city
undergoes cycles of economic, social and cul-
tural change. London still has one of the old-
est and most expensive underground systems
in the world, which is about to undergo a
massive facelift through a controversial pub-
lic-private finance initiative that will affect
travel in London for the next decades. To pro-
tect Londoners from spiralling prices –
according to UBS, London in 2006 is the
world’s most expensive city – there is a
requirement that 50% of any new housing
project must consist of affordable housing,
not only for families on ‘waiting lists’ but for
key-workers like firemen, nurses and police-
men who are otherwise being progressively
priced out of the market. The reality in many
of London’s inner city areas is still bleak,
where over half of all children live in poverty
(52%), and across the city 85,000 children live
in temporary housing, many in 150,000 offi-
cially ‘overcrowded’ households. The new
generation of housing typologies currently
being designed for London’s new communi-
ties – with a large concentration in the
Thames Gateway in the ex-Docklands area –
has the potential for relieving pressure on
housing demand, but risks polarising the rela-
tively diffuse distribution of wealth in
London, that determines its diverse character.
Two years of urban travel and investigation
have – as Saskia Sassen has put it – turned a
group of urban ‘nomads’ into an urban ‘tribe’.
Together we have felt and observed how
underneath the skin of at least these six world
cities lie deep connections between social
cohesion and built form, between sustainabil-
ity and density, between public transport and
social justice, between public space and toler-
ance, and between good governance and good
cities that matter to the way urban citizens live
their lives. Perhaps more so than ever before,
the shape of cities, how much land they occu-
py, how much energy they consume, how
their transport infrastructure is organised
and where people are housed – in remote,
segregated environments behind walls or in
integrated neighbourhoods close to jobs,
facilities and transport – affects the environ-
mental, economic and social sustainability 
of global society.
Ricky Burdett, Director, Urban Age, LSE
FEELING THE URBAN AGE
wo years. Six cities. New York,
Shanghai, London, Mexico City,
Johannesburg and Berlin.
Together they offer a cross-sec-
tion of our Urban Age in the
very year that more than half of
the world’s population has
moved to urban areas. In one
generation’s time, by 2050, three quarters of
the planet’s 8 billion people will be urban,
while only a century ago 90% of humanity
was living in villages and fields. Today, one
million people a week move in the opposite
direction – from the fields to the city. Behind
the dramatic statistics lie very different viscer-
al realities that link urban form to urban soci-
ety, shaped by the homogenising impact of
global flows of capital, people and energy.
And each city form – compact, high-rise, low-
rise, hyper-dense, sprawling, dispersed, poly-
centric, mono-centric, organic, geometric,
informal or unplanned – brings with it its
own set of social, economic and environmen-
tal consequences.
Of the six cities visited, Mexico City epito-
mises the tensions between spatial and social
order. Its endless low-rise spread, with 60% of
its 20 million inhabitants living in illegal and
informal housing, conceals a fast developing
landscape of difference exacerbated by the
dominance of the car in a city where petrol is
cheaper than mineral water. Investment into
two-tier motorways, rather than into the 
type of sustainable public transport that 
has so successfully transformed Bogotá or
Curitiba, are pulling the city even further
apart, lengthening commuting times for its
workers and pushing the poor to the far
fringes of this seemingly limitless city. Here
the rich seek protection in golf-course resi-
dential typologies in armed and gated com-
munities, or the emerging vertical ghettoes of
Santa Fe with their shimmering high-rises
overlooking the organic but well-established
shanty towns, where the vibrant informal sec-
tor constitutes 60% of the city’s economy.
Despite the high quality of the city’s early 20th-
century well-planned, compact neighbour-
hoods of Condesa and Roma, architects and
planners are struggling to convince their civic
leaders that intensification of the city’s central
districts is the solution to its massive infra-
structure deficiencies – poor public transport,
lack of water, crumbling terrain and lack of
open space – while the absence of any form of
growth boundary or development control
outside the city’s legal boundaries makes any
attempt at city planning meaningless.Yet,
architecture and urban design are still manag-
ing to play a significant social role. Even the
controversial private sector led regeneration
of the recently abandoned Centro Historico,
with street improvements, pedestrianisation
and city centre housing, reflects the impact
the built environment can have on the image
and identity of a city struggling to establish its
credentials as a democratic and economically
thriving city, in a period of intense political
and economic change. Having perhaps
reached a natural limit to its horizontal
expansion, Mexico City needs to untangle its
messy governance structures and recognise
that parallel policies of region-wide growth
containment coupled with a re-densification
of its more central neighbourhoods and
extensive rail-based public transport are the
only way forward in responding to the city’s
seemingly intractable spatial problems.
The civic leaders of Johannesburg face sim-
ilar but more extreme challenges in tackling
the radical demise of its Downtown. Home to
the city’s major financial institutions up to the
end of Apartheid in 1994, the central, gritty
district of Hillbrow has become a no-go area
to black and white residents alike in the space
of a few years. At night the Downtown area is
eerie, with flickering lights of makeshift
kitchens in multi-storey apartments indicat-
ing the presence of a new, disenfranchised
urban subclass. The effect of this transforma-
tion has been profoundly spatial. A large per-
centage of the city’s business institutions have
moved out – recently completed hotels and
office blocks remain empty or boarded up in
the centre – to the anodyne suburban centres
of Sandton and Rosebank, surrounded by a
fast expanding sea of walled shopping centres
and gated residential communities – inhabit-
ed by white families and the new emerging
class of ‘economically empowered’ blacks.
Soweto and Alexandra, the formerly segregat-
ed black townships with single-storey shacks
or two-storey homes laid out on a regular
grid, remain physically, if not politically, seg-
regated, with little or no public transport
except for the unreliable and expensive com-
munal taxi service which constitutes the only
lifeline to jobs. In a region that will become
one of the most populous in Africa – the
twelfth largest in the world by 2050 despite
the effects of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and 
an average life expectancy of 52 – and has 
set itself the target of becoming a ‘global 
city region’, Johannesburg’s 3 million plus
population is growing at a significant pace,
creating a physical landscape that celebrates
difference over inclusion – behind gates, cam-
eras and barbed wire – where public space
fails to perform its democratic potential as a
place of interaction and tolerance, and where
a non-existent public transport system
reduces the possibility of economic progress.
As a new generation of civic leaders begin to
tackle these complex urban questions, only
twelve years after the birth of a new South
Africa, Johannesburg is in a position to redi-
rect its considerable economic power towards
the construction of a more compact and inte-
grated environment, through policies and
actions that prioritise public transport and
investment in the centre, retro-fit its disen-
franchised communities with social spaces
and facilities and contain the proliferation of
out-of-town shopping malls and gated com-
munities, preparing the ground for a new
phase of development that will inevitably fol-
low as the region continues to expand.
Like all the other cities of the Urban Age,
with the exception of Berlin, New York is also
growing, once again, having experienced and
recovered from a period of relative conflict,
crime and economic decline. Today the dens-
est city in the USA is building on its ‘melting
pot’ status as the only American ‘majority-
minority’ city, where over half of the 8 million
people living in the city’s five boroughs are of
non-white, non-Hispanic origin. Its compact
urban core, with residential blocks arranged
along a tight and regular urban grid and
active street frontages lined by shops, has
demonstrated resilience, accommodating
waves of colonisation by different ethnic
groups, artists and cultural entrepreneurs,
and varying forms of economic activity –
from garment sweatshops to corporate head-
quarters – underscoring the importance of
built form in sustaining cycles of urban
change. Despite the growth in business and
services, New York’s less affluent residents still
suffer from an acute shortage of affordable
housing, high levels of crime and poor inner
city schools in one of the world’s richest cities,
where the average GDP per person is $40,000.
The sheer density of the city and its physical
distribution between the Hudson and East
rivers supports what is one of the most effi-
cient public transit systems in the world, used
by over half the population to go to work (in
Los Angeles it is only 20%). Despite huge
investment in its transport system over the
last decades – over $40 billion – the ‘city’ of
New York suffers from a flawed system of gov-
ernance where the budget of the Mass Transit
Authority is determined hundreds of miles
away in the state capital of Albany – rather
than by the Mayor of New York – resulting in
poor strategic coordination, best illustrated
perhaps by the ongoing Ground Zero débâcle.
Together with a string of new housing 
projects on the edges of Manhattan,
Brooklyn, Queen’s and the Bronx, a series of
linear parks and open spaces are being devel-
oped on derelict industrial sites that have the
potential of creating a ‘Blue Belt’ around
Manhattan, providing an urban lung for its
high density residents. While this large scale,
private sector ‘urban retro-fitting’ initiative
responds to overheated market demands, it
risks fuelling an inevitable process of gentrifi-
cation of the next generation of ‘target areas’
which, without the appropriate policies that
determine social mix of people and uses, or
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AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
GLOBAL CITY?
tepping out from underneath
the glass arches of Berlin’s
brand new main railway sta-
tion, the Hauptbahnhof, one is
greeted by a plethora of
grandiose architectural gestures
set against the backdrop of a
vast expanse of undeveloped
ground. One’s gaze may come to rest on the
Federal Chancellery, designed by Axel
Schultes, or on the ‘Band des Bundes’, the
‘Federal Belt’ of newly constructed govern-
ment buildings; one may take in Norman
Foster’s Reichstag cupola or the completely
redeveloped Potsdamer Platz and recall that, a
mere fifteen years ago, none of these struc-
tures existed. What is even more striking from
this vantage point is that the city, as people’s
living space, does not seem to intersect with
the Berlin that is the new representative centre
of Germany. City dwellers and citizens evi-
dently inhabit two decidedly distinct spheres.
Unlike many other European cities, Berlin has
no clearly defined city centre complete with
market square, city hall and cathedral. Such
central space simply does not exist here. More
than ever, Berlin is a conglomeration of paral-
lel worlds, a hotchpotch of stages on which
long-established residents, newcomers and
tourists make their respective entrances.
The Berlin Wall saved the Western part of
the city from the fate that, after the War, had
typically befallen so many other West German
cities with their emptying town centres and
fraying edges, their populations slowly
spilling over into the surrounding country-
side.Yet there was a price to pay for this in
Berlin, namely the destruction of a coherent
urban structure. The bombings of World War
II and the subsequent partition had carved up
Berlin’s infrastructure, its canalisation, its net-
work of roads and its railway system.Vast
areas of derelict land soon became a hallmark
of this fragmented city.
When the Berlin Wall fell and Berlin
became, albeit by a narrow parliamentary
majority, the capital of the newly unified
Germany, expectations ran high and grand
visions abounded. Surely, the city would soon
be home to six million people, and all manner
of fanciful plans were drawn up for this new
metropolis: Berlin was to become the power-
house of the new Republic, the focal point for
an entire ‘Generation Berlin’, the ‘hub’ that
would connect East and West, a veritable ‘lab-
oratory of unification’. Such promises were
directly rooted in the rhetoric and practices of
the Cold War, when, thanks to huge subsidies
provided by the two respective German states,
West Berlin had been established as a
‘Window on Freedom’, while East Berlin stood
proud as the ‘capital of the first Workers and
Peasants’ State on German soil’. On either side
of the Wall, Berliners themselves tended to
view such labels – which bore precious little
relation to the realities of their everyday lives
– with a healthy amount of scepticism. While
others were certainly welcome to entertain
illusions of grandeur, Berliners’ first loyalties
lay with their neighbourhoods and their lov-
ingly tended urban allotments.
Since the early 1990s, Berlin has, above all,
been a huge building site, and architecture
often had to grapple with paradoxical expec-
tations: on the one hand, the ‘Planwerk
Innenstadt’, a decidedly anti-modern re-
urbanisation and city-centre revitalisation
directive, decreed that the ‘historical city’
should be recovered; on the other hand,
politicians and residents alike expected the
architectural fraternity to create a metropolis
of the future. As a result, a lot of sound yet
middling designs, but few masterpieces, were
realised. Bold and innovative architectural
statements are indeed very few and far
between in this city. Today’s general sense of
disappointment with this state of affairs has
less to do with the buildings themselves than
with the hopes and expectations of the 1990s.
People had once more been prepared to put
their faith in the redemptive power of good
architecture, only to discover yet again that
redemption is the one thing architecture can-
not offer. Most importantly, however, the new
government buildings or the redeveloped
Potsdamer Platz failed to project an image
that Berliners could recognise. The city
remained as fragmented as ever.
In the midst of this unparalleled building
activity, and while ever more grand expecta-
tions were projected onto Berlin, the city’s
economy collapsed: the Eastern part of the
city as well as its Brandenburg hinterland
were labouring under the consequences of
deindustrialisation, while the Western part 
of the city grappled with the effects of the 
end of subsidisation. Since 1994, population
figures have been steadily declining, and
today, an entire suburban belt is economically
dependent on Berlin. Meanwhile, in the city
itself, more than 100,000 apartments stand
empty. For years, both commercial and resi-
dential properties have been in plentiful sup-
ply and remarkably cheap to get hold of.
Compared to Paris, Warsaw or London, this
seems an anomaly.
Maladministration and wastefulness have
left the city1 crippled with debt and effectively
bankrupt since 2002. The state of Berlin has
withdrawn from all major building projects,
which are now exclusively in Federal hands.
The attempts at regenerating the city’s urban
infrastructure have been largely successful
and, for the most part, the effects of war and
partition have been overcome, but there is a
painful lack of resources when it comes to
maintaining the city’s libraries, schools, the-
atres and universities. Berlin is a poor, eco-
nomically weak city that is terrifically cheap 
to live in.
Contrary to initial expectations, no new
urban élite has emerged post unification. A
bourgeoisie, in whatever shape or form, that
would set the tone, function as a social
barometer, speak out on behalf of the wider
public and take the lead on issues of common
concern, simply does not exist in Berlin.
Berlin is a city of ordinary people, students,
newcomers fleeing the provincial backwaters
of their childhoods, and a fast living and mer-
curial bohemian crowd made up of artists,
intellectuals, journalists, freelancers and plain
drifters. This latter set shapes the mood and
lifestyle that dominates Berlin’s inner city dis-
tricts. Most of these people lead rather precar-
ious and uncertain lives, but they have cer-
tainly made Berlin the only German city in
which a carefully chosen witticism, a surpris-
ing gesture or an ingenious performance
count for more than status and income.
Indeed, money plays an astonishingly minor
role in the social life of the city. And Berliners
like to take things slowly – a fact that surprises
even Swiss visitors to the city.
This bohemian scene has found a perfect
form of expression in the ‘intermediate utili-
sation’ of disused buildings. There are many
such empty structures all over Berlin, and
squatters are swift to move in and put them 
to creative use – dissolving traditional bound-
aries between art and entertainment, aesthetic
ambition and nightlife fun. The first such
project was the ‘Tacheles’ on Oranienburger
Straße, and eventually even the ‘Palace of the
Republic’, the former cultural-centre-cum-
seat of the East German parliament, (now in
the process of being demolished) was turned
into a temporary arts venue. Three old arm-
chairs and a hastily cobbled together installa-
tion usually suffice to transform the fleeting
moment into a memorable one. This culture
of the transitory, a legacy of our love affair
with everything crumbling, seems uniquely
suited to the character of the city, and Berlin
owes much of its attractiveness for tourists to
precisely this idiosyncrasy. It has put Berlin
firmly on the map in the European imagina-
tion and proves that, here at least, everything
is possible and anything goes, no matter how
limited your resources. A spirit of freedom is
indeed key to people’s life in this city.
Berlin’s economic plight, its poverty, its
lack of an effective élite, its fragmentation and
abundance of disused spaces, the weakness of
its administration and the continuing East-
West divide – all these are the very conditions
of Berlin’s intellectual as well as real life char-
acter. Three factors will determine the city’s
fate over the coming years: immigration from
Eastern Europe, a brain drain among the
young, and the continuing lack of a city centre
in the good old European sense of the word.
For most of its history, Berlin has been a
rather dismal one horse town. It became the
capital of Germany because it had been the
capital of Prussia. Since the dissolution of
Prussia, it has become apparent that the city is
barely able to survive by its own efforts, sur-
rounded as it is by an impoverished region
that is gradually being abandoned by its
inhabitants. The political task of countering
this state of affairs with strong and effective
institutions is currently tackled only hesitant-
ly and without much energy or conviction.
What Berlin teaches architects and urban
planners is, above all, humility. The building
and planning frenzy of the 1990s showed that
architecture cannot be expected to counteract
the provisional and temporary nature of this
city, nor relieve its social frailty. What it can
do, however, is continue to create stages and
project images. Good metropolitan architec-
ture has much in common with good stage
design – a fact more apparent in Berlin than
anywhere else in the world.
Jens Bisky, journalist, Süddeutsche Zeitung
Translated from German by Alexa Alfer
1 Like, for example, Bavaria or Hesse, Berlin is a federal
state in its own right.
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ermany is currently rediscov-
ering the city. The themes of
crises and decay, which have
long dominated discussions on
the city, are being superseded
by a new passion for the city.
For some decades, German
cities have been losing popula-
tion and jobs. This problem affected cities in
East Germany the hardest after unification, as
the loss of jobs, the decline in population and
the moving away of young people with quali-
fications meant that they were faced with dra-
matic levels of negative growth. However,
from the beginning of the 21st century, there
have been clear signs pointing to a change in
urban development trends.
Some profound economic changes
occurred in cities, further accelerated by the
enormous effects of globalisation and digiti-
sation. The change from an industrial to a
service-led economy, based on science and
culture, particularly in the large West German
urban regions of Munich, Frankfurt, Cologne
and Hamburg, meant the development of a
new urban dynamic. We can now see a re-
urbanisation in terms of employment as well
as population, and even in East German cities
such as Leipzig, Dresden and Berlin the popu-
lation is once more increasing.
The urban system in Germany, as in many
other countries, shows that globalisation and
digitisation do not lead to a disintegration 
of the city, as predicted by many experts, but
to a re-evaluation of the city and the develop-
ment of a new form of urban centrality,
which, in Germany, takes the form of a
process of urbanisation.
While in most other countries, dominant
global cities have emerged, Germany has
none, but instead has a multi-polar urban 
system. As presented very convincingly by
Saskia Sassen in various publications, the new
type of global city takes on a strategic role.
The control, integration and management
functions of the commodity chains that are
spread throughout the world are concentrat-
ed in the global cities. At the same time, the
global city is a central location for production
and a transnational market place for high
quality, knowledge-based services.
How can we explain the absence of a
German city high up in the hierarchy of
global cities, even though Germany has held
the position of ‘export champion’ for many
years and has been exceptional with regard 
to the integration of its economy into the
world market?
In answer to this question, the peculiarities
and interruptions in German history are
often referred to. Germany only gained one
common capital city when the Prussian dem-
ocratic empire was founded in 1871. Berlin
became the seat of government and devel-
oped into Germany’s dominant economic
and cultural city but never achieved the cen-
trality of London or Paris. After the historic
disasters of the Nazi regime and the Second
World War, Berlin’s central role was totally
destroyed by the break-up of the German
Reich and the splitting of Germany into four
occupation zones. Many companies moved
their headquarters from Berlin to West
Germany. Following a resolution by the
American occupation government, the new
Bank Deutscher Länder (Bank of German
States), which was the predecessor of the
Deutsche Bundesbank, was founded in
Frankfurt after the closure of the Reichsbank
in Berlin. As a consequence, the Deutsche
Bank and the Dresdner Bank moved their
headquarters to Frankfurt. At the same time,
the American occupation government decid-
ed to develop Frankfurt airport to be the cen-
tral base of the US Airforce in Germany.
Frankfurt’s function as a gateway and an
international financial centre was a direct
result of these decisions. Similar historical
decisions led to the specialisation of other
cities: Munich became Germany’s high-tech
metropolis; Hamburg, its news and media
centre; and, with the creation of the German
Federal Republic in 1949, the seat of govern-
ment was moved to Bonn. Although the role
of political capital was given back to Berlin
after unification, it is unlikely that Berlin will
ever regain its former central economic role.
This historical sketch implicitly classifies
Germany’s urban network as a special case in
the hierarchy of the global urban system. Can
Germany really be considered to be a special
case that shows deficits?
An alternative explanation can be found in
the discussion on ‘Varieties of Capitalism’
(Hall/Soskice). If it is true that modern capi-
talism is not a homogeneous entity, but that
different models of capitalism have developed
under different historical conditions, then it is
not unlikely that these different models also
have correspondingly different patterns of
urbanisation. The ‘belated’ industrial nation
of Germany had already developed an alter-
native to the liberal production system at the
end of the 19th century, which can be charac-
terised as a form of regulated, corporate mar-
ket economy. This model of ‘Rheinian Capit-
alism’ combined with strong federal struc-
tures, formed the basis for the economic and
social system of West Germany. It is very likely
that Germany has not only created an alterna-
tive model of production, but also an alterna-
tive and effective model of urbanisation.
Characteristic of this model of urbanisa-
tion is both the polycentrality of the urban
system with its distinct complementary divi-
sion of labour between individuals cities, and
the phenomenon of regional ‘manufacturing
service districts’.
Whereas globalisation in the 1980s and
1990s led to a strong global dispersion of
industrial functions in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries, the urban regions in Germany still have
a strongly interactive dynamic of developing
knowledge-intensive industries. Further-
more, the German urban system is connected
to the European and global networks of cities.
The individual cities can only develop their
capacity and innovativeness in their spe-
cialisms with the help of very effective net-
works and cooperation.
As Saskia Sassen rightly points out, a global
city is by definition part of a network. This
applies even more strongly to the urban sys-
tem in Germany, whose multi-tiered net-
works are of a regional, national, European
and global nature. Thus the German urban
system could prove to be a valid future alter-
native to the highly centralised model of the
global city.
Dieter Läpple is Professor of Regional & Urban
Economics at HafenCity University Hamburg
Translation from German by Anne Rigby
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URBAN AGE: GLOBAL OVERVIEW
The relentless pace of contemporary urban growth becomes
particularly evident in a number of rapidly expanding cities,
where the number of new city residents increases by the hour.
As is the case with other indicators of contemporary urbanisa-
tion, the fastest growing cities in the world are located outside
the advanced capitalist core. Lagos is adding an average of 67
new residents every hour, putting enormous strains on its
already challenged urban infrastructure. Cities in the Indian
subcontinent are also expanding rapidly: New Delhi adds 64
residents an hour, Mumbai 49 and Dhaka 61.
URBANISATION OF THE WORLD 
HUMAN FOOTPRINT
URBANISATION AND KEY INDICATORS BY COUNTRY
In the contemporary urban age, the spatial effects of city-based
economies, cultures and societies are being felt in virtually
every corner of the planet. Beyond the massive expansion of
urbanised areas and the consolidation of regional cities reach-
ing continental scales, it is estimated that over 80% of the
Earth’s land surface is influenced by the human footprint.
Activities as diverse as agriculture, industrial development and
tourism are spreading across the world linked to urban centres
through thick networks of production and consumption.
There is a strong interconnection between an urban agenda of
sustainable development for cities and a global environmental
agenda.
Out of the four indicators urbanisation, energy consumption,
car ownership and youth, higher levels of the first three are gen-
erally indicating more advanced economies and only youth
with its extreme concentration in Central Africa appears as a
proxy for the developing world. This far, higher levels of urban
populations are accompanied by higher energy consumption
and car use but not with youth.
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Car ownership / Source: The World Bank
Energy consumption / Source:
International Energy Agency (IEA), 2004
Urbanisation, 2005 / Source: World
Urbanisation Prospects, 2003 Revision,
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Youth / Source: World Urbanisation
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THE SIX CITIES: REGIONAL OVERVIEW
Metropolitan region
Leipzig
State of Berlin
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemployment
19.0%
Foreign born
13.7%
Car ownership
303/1,000 people
One person households
50.7%
GDP/capita
€ 23,400
Berlin
Germany
Metropolitan region
New York City
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemployment
5.8%
Foreign born
36.6%
Car ownership
206/1,000 people
One person households
31.9%
GDP/capita
€ 46,800
New York
USA
Metropolitan region
Shanghai Municipality
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemployment
4.4%
Foreign born
0.7% Car ownership
62/1,000 people
One person
households
9.7%
GDP/capita
€ 6,400
Shanghai
China
Metropolitan region
Birmingham
Greater London
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemploymen
6.9%
Foreign born
27.1%
Car ownership
340 cars/1,000 people
One person households
34.1%
GDP/capita
€ 32,200
London
UK
Metropolitan region
PueblaToluca De Lerdo
Mexico D.F.
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemployment
4.8%
Foreign born
0.7%
Car ownership
397/1,000 people
One person households
9.7%
GDP/capita
€ 12,200
Mexico City
Mexico
Metropolitan region
City of
Johannesburg
50%
100%
150%
200%
Unemployment
37.4%
Foreign born
6.7%
Car ownership
183/1,000 people
One person households
25.1%
GDP/capita
€ 3,100
Johannesburg
South Africa
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Today the population of
Berlin stands at approximate-
ly 3.4 million. During the last
century, Berlin’s growth, rela-
tive to other large European
cities like London, has been
fairly slow. In fact Berlin pres-
ents an anomaly in a world of
cities that are rapidly expand-
ing. By the end of the 20th cen-
tury, the city’s population
showed a mere 72% increase
from its level in 1900. Even
more striking, in the past
decade of increased invest-
ments to Berlin there was a
population decline of 1.5%.
At €23,354 per capita,
Berlin’s Gross City Product is
substantial.Yet this, the
largest city in Germany, has
only a 3.5% share of the
country’s GDP and a limited
centrality within the German
economy. The city’s embat-
tled public finances compli-
cate its economic recovery
and limit its employment and
development policies.
Berlin covers approximate-
ly 892 square kilometres,
stretching out along the Spree
River and its plateaus. In
Berlin, open space has not
been an afterthought to city
planning; open and recre-
ational space accounts for
45% of the city’s surface. The
gross residential density of
Berlin is about 3,800 people
per sqkm.
For the first time in its histo-
ry, New York City’s popula-
tion passed the 8 million
mark in the year 2000 after a
decade of strong growth.
Since then, the city has con-
tinued to add residents, and
this trend is expected to con-
tinue over the next ten years.
Regional growth outside the
city has also continued apace.
With a Gross City Product
of approximately €39,500
per capita, New York is one of
the world’s richest cities. This
juggernaut urban economy
generates up to 4% of the
entire US GDP. It has been
pointed out often that even
with the enormous wealth
generated by the city, there is
a persistent level of poverty in
New York.
New York City covers
approximately 830 square
kilometres, of which 25% is
dedicated to open and recre-
ational space. The gross resi-
dential density of New York
City is about 9,600 people per
sqkm, by far the highest in the
United States. However, this
density level drops signifi-
cantly outside the city. Also,
densities across New York are
unevenly distributed, and
vary widely from peaks in
parts of Manhattan to the rel-
atively low densities in the
outer boroughs with a
notably suburban character.
Within China’s current legal
framework, Shanghai can be
understood as a city-state: it
extends over 6,300 square
kilometres and has more than
18 million inhabitants.
Whereas its traditional city
boundaries demarcate an area
of 289 square kilometres, in
which 6.5 million people live
at very high residential densi-
ties, most of Shanghai's terri-
tory is now considered
urbanised and reaches an
average density of 2,900 peo-
ple per sqkm, arranged in a
seemingly chaotic patchwork
of agricultural, residential
and industrial land uses.
Since 1992, the Shanghai
economy has shown rapid
growth, and it is expected to
continue, expanding by more
than 10% annually for at least
another decade. The urban
economy is also modernising:
approximately half of the
labour force now works in the
service sector, while 36% are
employed in a diversified set
of industries. The Yangtze
River Delta – Shanghai's
wider economic base reach-
able within a three-hour drive
from the city – comprises
22% of China's productive
capacity and generates 30%
of its exports.
After a decade and a half of
significant population
growth, Greater London cur-
rently has about 7.5 million
residents; projections indi-
cate that this figure will reach
8 million within the next
decade. Greater London cov-
ers approximately 1,600
square kilometres of land area
at a gross residential density
of about 4,700 people per
sqkm. However, almost half
of this surface is comprised of
open and recreational space.
The city has decided to
accommodate the expected
population growth within its
existing urbanised area
through structural densifica-
tion.
In recent times London, a
service-led urban economy
with a global orientation, has
experienced what is perhaps
an unprecedented economic
bonanza. Currently its Gross
City Product is estimated at
€34,500 per capita account-
ing for almost 20% of the
UK’s national economy.Yet a
hard core of poverty lingers in
Inner London, particularly in
its eastern and southern
areas.
The current population of
Mexico City Metropolitan
Area is estimated at 18 mil-
lion, of which 8.6 million live
within the Federal District.
Both the population and
urbanised area of Mexico City
Metropolitan Area have
expanded dramatically since
the mid-20th century. Both
continue to grow in complex
patterns – whereas the urban
core has regained some popu-
lation, suburban sprawl con-
tinues apace, fuelled by low-
cost mortgages and a lax reg-
ulatory framework.
The Federal District covers
about 1,488 square kilome-
tres. In the urbanised north-
ern portion, open and recre-
ational space is scarce. The
gross residential density in
this part of the district is
about 2,090 people per sqkm.
Expanding the amount of
recreational space and the
number of cultural facilities
for the residents of this high-
density area is considered
a fundamental priority among
many Mexican town 
planners.
Mexico City is of para-
mount importance for the
Mexican national economy.
Its Gross City Product
(€105,000 million) con-
tributes 22% of Mexico’s
GDP.
The current population in the
City of Johannesburg is ca 3.2
million. It is estimated that
the city grew 4% per year on
average in the late 1990s and
some projections present a
growth scenario in which
metropolitan Johannesburg
will reach almost 15 million
people by 2015. The urban
core of Gauteng province is
expected to become the
world’s twelfth largest city-
region, behind Lagos yet larg-
er than Los Angeles.
Johannesburg is consid-
ered the economic engine of
South Africa and its urban
economy has a growing con-
tinental and global reach. In
2003, its share of South
Africa’s total economic out-
put was c 17%. Johannesburg
is a service-oriented econo-
my: 74% of people are
employed by services, busi-
nesses or the real estate sector.
With Johannesburg’s new
boundaries, the city now
stretches over 1,600 square
kilometres, reaching a gross
residential density of ca 1,900
people per sqkm. This is a low
urban density by internation-
al standards, yet the highest of
all urban areas in South
Africa. Densities vary widely
across the metropolis, reach-
ing peaks in both disadvan-
taged inner-city neighbour-
hoods and the peripheral
township of Alexandra.
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POPULATION GROWTH
Population growth in the six
Urban Age cities follows a
variety of different patterns.
London, New York and Berlin
had their period of exponen-
tial growth at the beginning
of the 20th century; Mexico
City, Shanghai and
Johannesburg did not start to
grow at similar rates before
the 1950s. By 1910, London
and New York had already a
total population of above 5
million and share a period of
decline followed by growth in
recent years. It was not until
1990 that populations of
Mexico City and Shanghai
crossed the 15 million mark.
BERLIN 
COMPARED TO GERMANY
LONDON 
COMPARED TO THE UK
NEW YORK 
COMPARED TO THE USA
URBANISATION BY 
SELECTED COUNTRIES
All three countries with
advanced economies includ-
ing the US, Britain and
Germany were already largely
urbanized by 1950. Since
then, the proportion of urban
population in these countries
have only grown from
between 65 and 80% to levels
between 80 and 90%. Mexico
and South Africa started with
similar levels in 1950 of about
43% but Mexico urbanized
more rapidly and is about to
pass 80% within the next
decade. The case of China
is one ofextreme change where
the key phase of urbanisation
is a phenomenon of the
present.
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HOUSING AND URBAN NEIGHBOURHOODS: DENSITY
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DENSITY GRADIENTS
The world cities studied by
the Urban Age project present
divergent distributions of
urban density, land-use
arrangements and growth
models. The highest gross res-
idential density peak is
reached in some central city
neighbourhoods of Shanghai
which accommodate over 600
people per hectare. However,
Shanghai as a whole is not the
densest city in the group as
density falls abruptly as soon
as one leaves the city centre.
With 96 people per hectare on
average, New York occupies
that position. Mexico City
comes close, but without
reaching Manhattan-like
peaks in its centre and main-
taining a more homogenous
high density throughout the
entire urban area. The
European cities, London and
Berlin, show the flattest densi-
ty curves, nevertheless achiev-
ing a higher overall density
than Johannesburg. In this
African metropolis pockets of
extreme high density in the
inner-city and underserved
areas in black townships
break the low-density monot-
ony of urban sprawl.
Cities throughout the
world need to respond to the
demographic pressures lead-
ing to rapid urban growth.
Densification rather than
horizontal expansion is how
growing cities can take more
environmentally sustainable
and socially inclusive devel-
opment paths. Achieving this
goal requires a careful mix of
infrastructure investments,
land-use coordination, social
policies and urban design.
The latter is particularly cru-
cial to maintain the liveability
and broad attractiveness of
urban environments under-
going processes of densifica-
tion. More research is needed
to understand the varying
capacity of different street
grids and block layouts to
accommodate growth while
preserving urban character
and insuring adequate
amounts of personal and
household space. Sufficient
amounts of open and green
space are another necessary
component of sustainable
densification.
Even in cities experiencing
demographic decline, as in
the case of Berlin, design-
based interventions have the
potential to manage change,
re-adapting existing struc-
tures to new conditions and
even generating an attractive-
ness of place that could lead
into an urban turnaround.
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The transport infrastructure
and mobility patterns of the
six Urban Age cities offer a
striking illustration of very
specific geographic, historic
and political conditions.
Regardless of the differences
between the six cities there is
clearly one identifiable sub-
group that includes the older,
mature cities like New York,
London and Berlin. All three
are characterised by an exten-
sive urban rail system. Berlin’s
U- and S-Bahn system
extends over 396 km within
the city. New York’s subway is
370 km long and was strongly
influenced by the administra-
tive landscape that cut off the
system from urbanised areas
west of the city’s core.
London’s 480 km of under-
ground rail mainly serves
North London due to the lim-
itations of early 20th-century
technology to deal with geo-
logical constraints south of
the River Thames. In addi-
tion, all three cities rely on an
extensive network of regional
rail servicing their metropoli-
tan regions while being suffi-
ciently connected to intercity
rail. Mobility patterns reflect
this extensive availability of
public transport with modal
split shares of over 50% for
work-related trips in New
York, and around 30% of all
trips in London and 27% in
Berlin. Public transport affin-
ity in the three cities comes
along with similarly high lev-
els of walking and biking:
32% in Berlin and 25% in
London. In Manhattan walk-
ing to work is the mode of
choice for more than 22% of
its residents.
Transport patterns in the
three rapidly expanding cities
– Shanghai, Mexico City and
Johannesburg – are more
diverse. In all three the period
of exponential growth and
infrastructure building came
much later. Mexico City was
the first of the three and start-
ed building its underground
in the late 1960s and today
operates an efficient 200 km
long network. Despite being a
reliable system, it is only used
by 14% of the city’s popula-
tion. Meanwhile, minibus
services account for more
than half of all trips.
Johannesburg has no under-
ground rail system and most
of the 120 km of surface rail
serves only the older areas of
the city. The majority of new
affluent developments rely on
the private car. The 12,500
privately run mini taxis are
used for 20% of journeys to
work while 40% of all jour-
neys to work are still done by
foot. Shanghai’s first under-
ground metro line was
opened only a decade ago.
The total length of the current
metro system is 65 km, but
another 10 lines totalling 218
km are under construction,
reflecting the scale of growth
and reach in the city’s infra-
structure. The share of public
transport is rapidly growing
with 23% of daily trips to
work using some form of
public transport, including
rail, metro and bus.
The distribution of employ-
ment by sector in all of the
Urban Age cities shows the
extent to which cities have
changed into service-based
economies. For all of the
cities, the service sector
employs more than half of the
urban labour force. This tran-
sition appears the most far
reaching in New York and
London where less than 10%
of the urban labour force is
engaged in industrial activi-
ties.Yet cities are far from
becoming mono-cultural
‘office economies’, in fact
financial and business servic-
es are the main employment
category only in London.
Even in New York, it is ‘other
services’ that make up almost
half of the city’s employment
base. This broad category
includes a diverse range of
urban activities including
personal, social, health, edu-
cational and entertainment
services. All of these niches
require specialised work
places from where they can
contribute the most efficient-
ly to the urban economy.
The reduced employment
share of urban manufactur-
ing does not diminish the
importance of this sector
within urban production
complexes, supporting lead-
ing sectors of a city’s econo-
my. Moreover, Shanghai,
which is one of the fastest
growing urban economies in
the world, retains an impor-
tant manufacturing base.
Shanghai’s various industries
employ up to a third of the
city’s labour force and are
seen as one of the pillars of
this rapidly expanding global
economic node.
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Social inclusion is one of the most important challenges for
contemporary cities. All of the six cities – Berlin, Johannesburg,
London, Mexico City, New York and Shanghai – present signifi-
cant concentrations of socially disadvantaged populations,
even though most of them are in a period of economic expan-
sion and sustained physical development. Urban concentra-
tions of social disadvantage appear in manifold geographical
patterns. Some cities are characterised by their socially and
physically decayed inner cities, as can be seen in parts of East
and South London and parts of New York City’s boroughs out-
side Manhattan. Others relegate their disadvantaged popula-
tions to underserved metropolitan peripheries as is the case in
Shanghai and Mexico City. Berlin and Johannesburg present a
combination of both patterns, each of them showing a specific
geography inherited from their unique development histories
and recent transformations.
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